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Take the Small Boat Threat Seriously 
By Captain Wayne P. Hughes, Jr., U.S. Navy (Retired) 
U,r my purposes, small boats comprise 
.I' what Sir Julian Corbett called "the 
flotilla." In his analysis of naval tactics 
at the dawn of the 20th century, Some 
Principles of Maritime Strategy,' Sir Ju­
lian said a navy had three mutually ex­
clusive, mutually reinforcing components: 
the battle fleet, which destroys the enemy 
fleet; cruisers, which raid enemy com• 
merce and prot ect friendly commerce; 
and a flotilla of small craft in large num­
bers, which fight for control of narrow 
seas. 
Coastal waters became the province of 
small combatants at the beginning of the 
20th century with the perfection of the 
mine and torpedo. It was unsafe for a bat­
tle fleet to enter an enemy's coastal 
waters and subject itself to attacks by tor­
pedo boats, submarines, and defensive 
mines. Writing in 1898, Vice Admiral S. 
0. Makarov, Imperial Russia's greatest
naval thinker, with droll insight said:
Up to the present (command of the 
sea} has been understood to mean that 
The Cold War is over, but many 
nations still operate light forces 
developed for that conflict, such as 
these Chinese Houku-class missile 
boats. Small boats always have been 
unsophisticated, but their inexpen­
siveness makes them affordable in 
large numbers for even minor navies. 
The U.S. Navy cannot afford to 
dismiss the threat these forces pose 
to operations In the littorals. 
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the fleet commanding the sea openly 
plies upon it and the beaten antagoni t 
does not dare to leave his pons. Would 
this be so today? Instructions bearing 
on the subject counsel the victor to 
avoid night attack from the torpedo• 
boats of his antagonist .•. if the mat­
ter were represented lo a stranger he 
would be astonished. He would prob• 
ably a k whether he properly under• 
stood that a victorious fleet must 
protect itself from the remnant of a 
vanquished enemy.? 
Only a few years later Admiral 
Makarov would go down with his flag• 
ship, victim of a Japanese mine off Rus• 
sia's port of Vladivostok. 
A Modern Flotilla 
Today, the flotilla suited for coastal 
operations-littoral warfare-is more 
complicated in composition than a cen­
tury a,go, comprising not only small 
fighting craft.but also low-flying aircraft 
nnd assorted means to delect, track, and 
target enemy ships of all sizes. Above 
all, it is complicated by the addition of 
many kinds of missiles. The breadth of 
littoral waters also has increased from a 
few score miles to hundreds of miles. 
The clutter that complicates coastal op­
erations was, a century ago, the coastal 
shipping. fishing boats, shoals, islands, 
cliffs, and inlets of the enemy's waters. 
Now coastal clutter also includes a high 
den ity of electronic signals and com­
mercial aircraft. A modem flotilla will 
have more elements to it and will face 
a more intricate tactical environment, but 
"the small boat threat" remains a fea­
tured component. 
I propose three way to assess the na­
ture and extent of thi small boat threat: 
1. Salvo Equations
The salvo equations described in my 
own work (and elsewhere) can help us 
understand contemporary missile war­
fare.1 These equations have many 
strengths and limitations. Their lessons 
are general and extend beyond the littoral 
environment, for one does not need to 
know how big or- small a "small boat" 
is to use them. Nor does it matter whether 
coastal or open- ocean operations are 
under inve ligation. 
The equations lend to the fundamen• 
tal conclu ion that when there is a force­
on-force exchange of mis ile fire, 
number are by for the most valuable at• 
tribute a force can have. They show that: 
► If you pack too much combat potential
in a single warship, you face the possi­
bility of losing much unused potential in
a missile exchange.
► If you have a fleet of multimission war­
ships with the flexibility to perfonn many
activities, then loss of a ship when per­
fonning one mission results in its loss for
all other missions.
► Many small enemy fighting craft com-

















































plicate your effort to detect, track, tar• 
get, and destroy enough of them 10 pre-
vent a successful enemy attack. 
• A formation of warships armed with 
very powerful missiles intended to destroy 
another formation of large warships is ill-
suited to fight a swarm of small craft, be-
cause powerful missiles are wasted in 
overkill while the swarm sucks the large 
warships dry of their ordnance. 
2. A Look Back at Fighting in Littoral 
Waters 
The preceding discussion is an appli-
cation of combat science in the extreme: 
abstract, dry, simplified, and mathemati-
cal. The opposite extreme is looking at 
coastal combat as pure an. described in 
histories and memoirs as ingenious, mul-
tifaceted, emotional, willful, and steeped 
in courage. 
U.S. PT boat performance in World 
War II was only marginally effective for 
many reasons-one being that the boats 
used the same faulty torpedoes that 
plagued our submarines. Another reason 
was that the PTs were manned by re-
servists who were viewed by the regular 
Navy as cowboys-dangerous to friend 
and foe alike. PT boats had few advocates 
in the regular Navy, and there was no 
serious attempt to integrate them with 
cruisers and destroyers, even when they 
were employed in the coastal waters of 
the upper Solomons and the Philippines. 
The suspicions, mediocre tactics. techni-
cal flaws, and lukewarm achievements of 
our PT boats are covered nicely in Cur-
tis Nelson's recent Hunters in the Shal-
low Seas.' 
More instructive is the British and Ger-
man experience in World War II in the 
North Sea, the Norwegian coast, the east-
ern coasts of Scotland and England, and 
the French, Belgian, and Dutch shallow 
coastal waters. The Battle of tire Narrow 
Seas by Peter Scott is a good description, 
but it appeared too soon after the war., 
Better is the autobiographical narrative of 
Peter Dickens, describing in great detail 
the motor torpedo boat (MTB) attacks on 
German coastal shipping in 1942. Dick-
ens carefully researched the Kriegsma-
rine's archives, admitting some sobering 
disappointments about his own flotilla's 
supposed successes. He describes the tac-
tical challenges, experimentations, and 
moves and countermoves exhibited on 
both sides. His MTBs' night attacks (op-
erations always were at night in fair 
weather or foul) were seen as so threat-
ening to German shipping that convoys 
were formed, and when the sinkings con-
tinued, the convoys sailed in daytime-
only to suffer even more severe losses to 
Royal Air Force bomber attacks. Unlike 
fleet actions (which tended to be few and 
Pruceedlng5 I October ?000 
far between), the battle of the flotillas 
was, like the air war over England and 
Germany, in constant ferment.• 
3. Combining Science and Art with 
Experimentation 
A third way to take the small boat 
threat seriously is to blend science and art 
with a set of experiments that could begin 
immediately, using a model-test-model 
approach. The model uses any of a vari-
ety of analytical methods. It would have 
four salient properties: 
• Take place in a real coastal setting that 
can then be transferred into an at-sea ex-
periment. A great deal of attention should 
be given to enemy players who are ac-
customed to littoral operations. Coast 
Guard officers are familiar with the diffi-
culties of inshore operations, and officers 
of friendly foreign navies are candidates. 
• Assign one of two missions to the 
U.S. forces. One is to deny the enemy the 
movement of shipping in his own coastal 
waters; the other is to protect our own 
shipping as it moves into the port of a 
friendly state being supported by our 
ground forces. I do not think the 
employments most often seen in U.S. 
studies, namely, the delivery of air and 
missile strikes or the execution of an op• 
posed amphibious assault, are the place 
to start. The strike scenario already is 
overworked and the amphibious assault 
is too challenging if the enemy.1has a re• 
spectable coastal defense. 
• Include the exact capabilities of exist-
ing U.S. forces and the imagined capa-
bilities of enemy missile boats and coastal 
submarines supponed by a coherent de• 
tection-and-targeting system. An air- and 
land-based missile threat could be added 
later. The tactics employed are dependent 
on the capabilities of both sides. Since the 
history of actual coastal operations is re-
plete with tactical move and coun1ermove, 
there is no reason to believe the best tac• 
tics can be discovered on the first try. The 
idea behind model•test•model is to im-
prove by experimentation. 
• The most difficult (but also most 
important) aspect of the model or simu• 
lation is to introduce a high density of 
sea-bottom, surface, aerial, and electronic 
clutter. This will be hard to do with a map 
exercise or simulation. That is why the 
model effort, the purpose of which is to 
go as far as possible in developing cam-
paign plans and tactics, must be followed 
by nn exercise at sea, where the geogra-
phy, oceanography, coastal traffic, elec-
tronic signals, and commercial aircraft 
will create the confusing environment that 
enhances the small boat threat. 
Our experience to date with fleet bat• 
tie experiments offers hope of valuable 
lessons 10 be learned. The difference 
here is the creation of a serious oppo-
nent in a force-on-force campaign that 
is competitive. To be blunt, the oppos-
ing forces should be sized realistically 
so that U.S. victory is not a foregone 
conclusion. 
When we practiced approaching the 
Soviet mainland we knew we faced a for-
midable system of seaward defenses in 
depth. After many years of study, analy-
sis, tactical development, and experi-
mentation at sea we had a pretty good 
idea of what we could and could not do. 
We analysts believed we could make in-
formed judgments about what constituted 
U.S.-Soviet maritime parity: how many 
carrier battle groups it would take to 
defend against how many Backfire regi-
ments, and how many nuclear attack sub-
marines we would need to reduce the 
Soviet submarines arrayed against our car-
rier battle force. In a similar vein, the ob-
ject of tlie model-test-model process 
would be to estimate the size of U.S. 
forces required 10 overcome different 
quantities of enemy coastal defenses and 
make a realistic assessment of losses, 
when a high level of tactical skill is ex-
hibited on both sides. 
The Experiments' Payoff 
After the at-sea test, then another round 
of tactical development and simulation 
would follow in which both sides would 
make improvements. By the time a sec-
ond sea test has been conducted a great 
deal should be known in three areas: 
• The composition and numbers of ex• 
isting U.S. Navy sensors, aircraft, and 
warships it will take to gain and maintain 
dominance in the home waters of sev-
eral levels of enemy coastal capabilities, 
with major attention to the small boat 
threat. 
• Lessons learned that will help develop 
Streetfighter characteristics, manning, 
tasks, tactics, and mutually supporting op-
erations with the existing blue-water 
Navy. 
• Indications of how to develop and em-
ploy unmanned vehicles of various de-
scriptions as companions, or eventual 
replacements, of Streetfighters. 
I offer a paragraph from chapter 11 of 
Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat as a 
suitable summary of the small boat threat 
and the need to take it seriously: 
A special concern for inshore warfare 
is a greater risk of catching a single 
ship napping because of the cluttered 
environment and the reduced battle 
space. I have yet to find a rationale for 
sending large, expensive, and highly 
capable warships into contested coastal 
waters unless they can take several 
[missile) hits and continue fighting 
I05 
without missing a beat after suffering 
a first auack by the enemy. It is bet• 
ter to fight fire with fire using ex-
pendable, missile-carrying aircraft or 
smn11 surface craft. In fact, ever since 
the introduction of numerous torpedo 
boats, coastal submarines, and mine-
fields early in this [the 20th] century, 
contested coastal waters have been 
taboo for capital ships and the nearly 
exclusive province of flotillas of small, 
swift, lethal fast-attack craft. 
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Reduced Manning and High-Tech Bridges Demand 
New Training Standards 
By Captain Brian Boyce, U.S. Navy (Retired) 
On the open sea, only one or two in-dividuals usually man merchant ship 
bridges. The entire crew may be fewer 
than 20 crewmembers, including seamen, 
cooks, and engineers. Other than the mas-
ter, there usually are only three officers 
(chief mate, second mate, and a third 
mate) who stand officer of the watch 
(OOW). Normally, the OOW will be as-
sisted by one or two other watchstanders, 
one of whom is the lookout, drawn from 
the rnnks of a handful of able-bodied and 
ordinary seamen. 
On Navy ships, the management of 
combat systems and other functions in-
creasingly have moved below decks, 
while core seamanship tasks have re-
mained on the bridge. If the DD-21 pro-
gram is any indication, the Navy will 
have integrated bridge systems designed 
to be operated safely and effectively by 
a single individual. Rules of the road re-
quire that a lookout also be on watch, 
and it is arguable whether the Navy ever 
will choose to man a bridge with a sin-
gle officer. Nevertheless, even with a 
lookout and other team members, in-
cluding a surface radar watch below 
decks, the officer of the deck on an inte• 
grated bridge system is going to have to 
be very well qualified. It is not an "entry-
level" position. 
Talent and experience are scarce re-
sources, and although a lot of both must 
be focused on the high-tech systems below 
decks, the Navy needs to ensure that this 
does not come at the expense of compe-
tence on the bridge. These single-person 
bridges will not be just on new-construc• 
tion DD-2ls. Advanced integrated bridge 
systems-the outgrowth of the Smart Ship 
Program-are being fitted and backfilled 
on many ships. As the Navy reviews its 
t raining programs to support innovations 
leading to reduced manning on advanced 
bridges, it might consider just how much 
like merchant marine bridges they will 
become. 
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Whether a ship is gray hulled or black 
hulled, it operates in the same environ-
ment of wind, sea, and current and obeys 
the same laws of physics. Regardless of 
how many people are on watch, the basic 
seamanship tasks of conning, lookout, log 
keeping, navigating, and communicating 
must be performed. It is the prudence and 
skill of the mariner in performing those 
tasks that makes for a safe passage or dic-
tates survival or disaster in a crisis. 
Mariners,,as they progress toward quali-
fications, will study the same natural laws 
and the same cues that will show which 
law is uppermost and what the ship will 
do in response. It is skill at mastering 
the situation that is being tested. The only 
difference is the path the mariner will use 
to achieve qualification. 
Many of the improvements in merchant 
ship professionalism have been stimulated 
by lessons learned in the wake of the 
Ex:ron Valdez and other disasters. Al-
though there have been some Band-Aid 
fixes, there also has been a long-term dis-
ciplined approach to progress. Shipping 
is the most international of all of the 
world's industries, as well as one of the 
most risky. Part of the risk is because of 
the great variety of ships from many na-
tions plying the same waters. These ships 
must understand each other's intentions 
clearly and be governed by the same laws 
and regulations. The body that drafts these 
international laws and regulations is the 
International Maritime Organization 
(IMO), an agency of the United Nations 
consisting of 158 member nations. The 
IMO's first task was the Convention for 
the Safety of Life at Sea in 1960. From 
that beginning, it expanded to address is-
sues such as pollution, the carriage of dan-
gerous goods, disability, compensation, 
and liability. 
In recent years, special attention has 
been given to the standards of crew per-
formance through a subcommittee of the 
Maritime Safety Committee. The original 
convention of this subcommittee was the 
Standards of Training, Certification, and 
Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW} in 
1978. These standards entered into force 
in 1984 and were amended in 1991, 1994, 
and 1995. The 1995 amendments to the 
STCW (which went into effect in Febru-
ary 1997) are the most extensive, in that 
they added the "STCW Code"-which 
turned the previous articles into specific 
standards and requirements. In the United 
States, the STCW resolutions are codified 
under various titles of the Code of Fed-
eral Regulations (CFR) that apply to U.S.-
flag merchant shipping. Foreign-flag 
vessels sailing in U.S. waters are covered 
by the same STCW codes, although 
administered under the laws of their coun-
tries of origin. U.S. Navy ships are oper-
ated in accordance with regulations issued 
by the Secretary of the Navy under au-
thority of Title 10 of the U.S. Code. 
While some portions of the CFR apply 
to both merchant shipping and the Navy 
(e.g., Chapter 33-The Rules of the 
Road), the STCW resolutions apply only 
to merchant shipping. Nonetheless, these 
accepted worldwide standards and pro-
fessional requirements levied on the mer-
chant mariner may have benefit to Navy 
training policy. 
Among the notable features of STCW 
'95 that represent a new approach affect-
ing crew training and operation of 
merchant ships is the establishment of 
minimum standards of competence. With 
the advent o f STCW ' 95, not only is 
knowledge tested, but understanding, 
proficiency. and competence must be 
demonstrated as well. STCW '95 cites the 
competence function to be assessed, the 
elements of competence to be examined, 
the criteria to be used for evaluating com-
petence, and the methods of demonstra-
tion that are acceptable. Administration of 
STCW is the responsibility of the flag na-
tion, and the training and evaluation of 
the various competence standards are ac-
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